The Heil v Rankin approach to law-making:who needs a legislature? by Campbell, Ian David
 1 
 
The Heil v Rankin Approach to Law-making: 







In a remarkably frank paper, Professor Andrew Burrows has shed some light on the 
process by which awards for non-pecuniary loss in personal injury cases were uplifted 
in Heil v Rankin, a process in which he played a leading role as a Law Commissioner. 
In apparent disregard of the criticisms to which this process has been subjected, 
Burrows regards it as an example of a valuable ‘methodology’ of common law law 
reform. These criticisms are reviewed in this paper and to them is added a criticism of 
the concept of ‘normal decision-making’ by the courts that is the basis of Burrows’ 
views. Heil v Rankin was far from normal decision-making, but in this it was merely 
of a piece with all awards of damages for non-pecuniary loss, for such damages have 
no grounding in the common law adjudication of awards of compensation. The further 
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development in Simmons v Castle of the judicial legislation effected in Heil v Rankin 
is also considered. 
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Introduction 
In academic debate in which achievement is evaluated according to the criteria of 
economy, effectiveness or efficiency which we normally use to decide whether an 
expenditure of resource is justified, it is impossible to deny that the personal injury 
system signally fails to achieve what it had been axiomatic to regard as its goals of 
compensation and deterrence. As a result, the academic defence of that system has 
taken one of two lines. One has been to confine the discussion to the formal law of 
liability, for in the absence of inquiry into the empirical consequences of the formal 
law, the unacceptability of those consequences is not even an issue. The other has 
been to move the discussion to a level at which the personal injury system is provided 
with other justifications, such as the vindication of rights, the furnishing of corrective 
justice, and the contribution to social solidarity claimed by civil recourse theory, 
though it remains essential that no empirical inquiry be made into whether the system 
actually has the consequences implied by these justifications. 
 A most interesting question about the way that UK economic and legal policy is 
formulated surely arises from this decoupling of the personal injury system from its 
consequences. For one might have supposed that, even if this decoupling is possible 
within academic debate, it absolutely should not be possible within policy debate, 
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which is obliged to consider empirical consequences and evaluate them according to 
the criteria previously mentioned. But, of course, there has been no official general 
review of the consequences of the personal injury system since the Pearson 
Commission reported in 1978 (Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury 1978), and no general review of any sort since that 
conducted under the auspices of the Oxford Centre for Socio-legal Studies published 
in 1984 (Harris et al. 1984). As we shall see, it would be wrong to regard the 
numerous Reports of the Law Commission on personal injury and related topics in the 
90s as a review in this sense, and all other official work, such as reviews of civil or 
personal injury litigation (the most important of which by Lord Justice Jackson 
(2009a) is considered at length below), or Select Committee Reports on the effect of 
changes to claims procedure and litigation funding on motor vehicle insurance 
(Transport Committee 2011; 2012; 2013, 2014),
1
 has been fragmentary. The Pearson 
Commission has itself been criticised for not addressing all of the fundamental issues 
of the ‘compensation debate’ about personal injury (Allen et al. (eds.) 1979), but 
subsequent official inquiries have been much more limited. Though academic 
research has furnished an accurate overview of the operation of the personal injury 
system, and in particular of the gross disparity between the consequences of that 
system implied by the formal law of negligence and its actual empirical consequences 
(Lewis and Morris 2012; Lewis 2016), there is no such official account which, using 
the resources of government, would, of course, be able to provide much greater detail. 
 The prima facie paradox of the continuing existence of the personal injury 
system and the lack of official inquiry into what it does would, of course, be much 
lessened or even disappear were the personal injury system a matter of purely private 
 4 
 
law decided by the courts in which the other branches of the state play no part, as 
much of the academic literature on the law of negligence implies or outright claims 
and as, I very strongly suspect, is the almost universal basis on which negligence is 
taught. Now, save by outright anarchists, whose views I shall, unfairly given their 
interest, simply put aside, it is not denied that private rights must rest on a public law 
framework.
2
 Negligence as private law indeed turns on the role of the courts, and that 
the courts can have a role is in the end a matter of coercion by the state, but in this 
negligence is akin to all private rights. However, it is vitally important to 
acknowledge that negligence rests on public law in an additional sense. 
 Though it would be possible to create a voluntary market of first party insurance 
against accident, and though such a market, if constructed on the foundation of a 
uniform, adequate system of what I shall persist in calling social security, could, 
despite inequality of income, satisfy standards of protection from want acceptable in 
liberal democratic society (Harris et al. 2002: 449-61; Campbell 2015), we do not do 
this, and the law of negligence is a matter of the courts determining the scope and 
content of liability which is imposed as an alternative to a voluntary market. The third 
party liability insurance system takes its shape from this foundation. In the UK, 
payment of the overwhelming majority of the costs of the personal injury system is, in 
fact, literally imposed on common citizens by compulsory liability insurance or public 
provision against liability, but this is theoretically less important than the fact that 
liability is an imposition by the courts. What is more, as a very valuable collection of 
papers edited by Professors Arvind and Steele ((eds.) 2012)
3
 has made abundantly 
clear, the legislature and the executive are intimately involved in making the personal 
injury system work in numerous other ways, by, for example, dovetailing social 
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security and tort compensation, setting the discount rate and publishing the Ogden 
Tables, providing evidence about claims to insurance investigators, trying to 
criminalise fraudulent claims, regulating the conduct of claims intermediaries, etc. 
Arvind and Steele’s collection makes it undeniable that the absence of a general 
official review of the personal injury system does not follow from an absence of state 
action. It follows from an absence of awareness of what the state is doing. 
  In a very remarkable chapter of a Festschrift for Professor Hugh Beale on his 
retirement from the Warwick Law School, Professor Andrew Burrows (2015) has 
given an account of one important instance of state support of the personal injury 
system.
4
 As the common law Law Commissioner between 1994 and 1999, Burrows 
played, it would seem, the major role in bringing about the increase of damages for 
non-pecuniary loss in Heil v Rankin.
5
 Though no precise quantification of the cost of 
this increase to date is available, it must be very considerable, running into billions. I 
will not consider the merits of this increase, for whilst, as I would abolish the personal 
injury system, it is obvious that I believe it was wholly unjustifiable, I equally accept 
that, once one has swallowed the existence of that system, Heil v Rankin was 
‘eminently sensible’ (Lewis 2001: 101). Indeed, Heil v Rankin can be criticised6 for 
doing rather less than the Law Commission had argued should have been done in the 
Report on non-pecuniary loss which led to the case being arranged (Law Commission 
1998a).
7
 I want instead to address the process by which this major coercive 
redistribution of the wealth of almost every UK citizen, about which Burrows has 
been very frank in his Festschrift chapter, was brought about. He makes it clearer than 
it was made in the Report on non-pecuniary loss itself (ibid.: para. 3.165)
8
 that the 
litigation, if this is the right word, which became Heil v Rankin was arranged, in what 
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we will see he calls an example of ‘a close working relationship between the Law 
Commission and the judiciary’ (Burrows 2015: 47), with the highest levels of the 
judiciary before the Report on non-pecuniary loss was published:
9
 
Support [for using the Court of Appeal to secure the uplift] had been 
obtained in advance of publishing [the Report on non-pecuniary loss] 
from Lord Woolf MR and the Lord Chief Justice Lord Bingham. After 
meeting with [the Commission], Lord Woolf raised the matter on the Law 
Commission’s behalf with the Judges’ Council; and Lord Bingham CJ 
wrote to the Law Commission [confirming that it would be] ‘possible for 
the Court of Appeal to hear a number of different appeals on quantum in 
personal injury cases [and for the Court] to be invited to rule in favour of 
… a general increase’. With that support, the Law Commission was 
confident that a way would indeed be found to bring the cases before the 
Court of Appeal, although, as a fall-back position, we did recommend 
legislation should the courts fail to make the recommended increase 
(Burrows 2015: 45-46). 
 I have nothing in substance to add to the opinion I formed about Heil v Rankin 
at the time, that by ‘avoiding the hazards of public accountability, the Court of 
Appeal, in an act of retrospective legislation which barely bothered to masquerade as 
a judgment’ had effected a major change in the law in a way which amounted to a 
‘public scandal’ (Harris et al. 2002: 442). But, of course, my opinion was in a very 
important sense wrong, for there was no such scandal. Burrows’ chapter is extremely 
enlightening on how it is that the working of the personal injuries system can be 
understood in such a way that this could be the case. 
 
What Did Heil v Rankin Do? 
During his term as a Law Commissioner, Burrows led, as part of the Sixth Programme 
of Law Reform, the most extensive official examination of the law of personal injury 
since the Pearson Commission (Law Commission 1995b: 26-27).
10
 This resulted in 
four Reports: on psychiatric illness (Law Commission 1998b), on medical expenses 
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and collateral benefits (Law Commission 1999b), on wrongful death (Law 
Commission 1999a) and, of most interest to us here, the Report on non-pecuniary 
loss. (To these must be added a Report on structured settlements and refinements of 
lump sum payments (Law Commission 1994b) produced under the previous common 
law Commissioner, Professor Jack Beatson, as he then was). Perhaps the most 
significant of the recommendations reached in all these Reports was that, as the 
conventional tariff for non-pecuniary loss in serious injury cases had markedly fallen 
behind inflation, it should be increased by at least 50% but not more than 100% (Law 
Commission 1998a: para. 3.110(1)). Serious injury was defined as an injury for which 
the conventional non-pecuniary loss award alone would be more than £3,000 (circa 
£4,750 in 2015 values), and awards between £2,001 and £3,000 would also be 
increased by tapered additions capped at less than 50% of then current awards (ibid.: 
para. 3.110(2)). 
 To one, like myself, who assumed that the result of such a recommendation 
would be a draft Bill at the end of the Report, the line taken over the possible 
implementation of this recommendation was striking. The recommendations of the 
previous Report on structured settlements had been brought into law by legislation 
before the Report on non-pecuniary loss was published, mainly by The Damages Act 
1996,
11
 and the Report on non-pecuniary loss did contain a draft Bill in respect of its 
other main conclusion about the role of the jury in personal injury cases (Law 
Commission 1998a: appendix A). But no draft Bill was produced in respect of the 
increase to non-pecuniary loss awards, and instead a range of mechanisms for 
bringing about that increase was extensively reviewed (ibid.: paras. 3.111- 3.170). 
The idea of juries doing this was ruled out (ibid.: paras. 3.114-3.117), in line with a 
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general argument that the role of juries in assessing damages should be further 
reduced (ibid.: Pt IV). A Compensation Advisory Board, a body of a sort then 
generally called a quango which probably would now be called an independent 
advisory agency (ibid.: paras. 3.114-3.129), and a tariff amended by Act of Parliament 
(legislative tariff) (ibid.: paras. 3.130-3.139), were rejected, as was putting on a 
statutory footing the appellate courts’ power to increase the tariff (ibid.: paras. 3.166-
3.170). What was left was using what the Report on non-pecuniary loss claimed was 
the appellate courts’ power to uplift the tariff by ‘normal decision-making’ (ibid.: 
para. 3.140), and it was recommended that that power should be exercised (ibid.: 
paras. 3.140-3.165). Though it did substantially less than the Commission had 
recommended, making no increase in regard of non-pecuniary loss awards below 
£10,000 and limiting the tapered addition to awards above £10,000 to a maximum of 
33% of then current awards, Heil v Rankin was the result of this recommendation.  
 The Commission’s opinion that the course of action which led to Heil v Rankin 
constituted normal decision-making by the courts was endorsed in the case itself. The 
important dictum of Lord Scarman in the House of Lords’ judgment in Lim Poh Choo 
v Camden and Islington AHA,
12
 to the effect that an uplift such as that on which the 
Court of Appeal was engaged in Heil v Rankin was properly a legislative matter, was 
distinguished on the basis that no change to the law was being made: 
So far as a change of the law is concerned, we of course endorse the 
approach of Lord Scarman. But, in considering whether the level of the 
awards of damages for non-pecuniary loss is too low, there is no change in 
the law involved even if we come to the conclusion that a change in the 
level is required. The court is doing no more than considering the 
adequacy of the level of current awards by applying existing principles 
and, in so far as they are inadequate, bringing them up to date. Lord 
Scarman is not suggesting that this is not an appropriate topic for the 
consideration of this court … We emphasise this because we have no 
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intention of seeking to involve ourselves with matters of policy-making 
which are more suited for Parliament than for the courts. We do have to 
concern ourselves with current standards within our society and economic 
conditions, but only so far as the performance of our duty to set the level 
of damages makes this necessary. We are not contravening the wise 
advice that the courts should seek, when possible, to avoid becoming 
involved in determining broad questions of social and economic policy.
13
 
 Vitally importantly, this view seems also to have been the view of the 
Government. I shall refer below to comments Burrows made on the position as his 
term at the Commission drew to an end. In those comments he refers to the 
Government’s response when asked about its plans to implement a number of the 
Reports published whilst he was a Commissioner. Having indicated a willingness to 
legislate in respect of some of these Reports, and undertaken to assess the impact of 
doing so, the Lord Chancellor’s Department then said:  
This assessment is only concerned with those Reports which recommend 
legislation concerning eligibility for damages and the size of damages 
awards. It will not consider [the Report on non-pecuniary loss], in which 
the Law Commission offers opinions of which the courts are free to take 
such account, if any, as they choose in the assessment of damages. This is 
an area of law which is in the courts’ independent sphere and where the 
Government has no plans to legislate.
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As was pointed out at the time (Harlow 2002: 10), were this uplift regarded as a 
legislative matter, this attitude should have been criticised as a quite indefensible 
instance of executive use of the judiciary to avoid Parliamentary scrutiny. One would 
have thought the uplift defensible only if it was an instance of normal decision-




How Was What Was Done in Heil v Rankin Done? 
Two preliminary points should be made about the claim that litigation of the sort 
brought about in Heil v Rankin was normal decision-making within the courts’ 
independent sphere which did not effect a change in the law. 
 First, an adequate understanding of Heil v Rankin has to begin with the 
recognition that, as a matter of procedure, the last thing that could be said of it was 
that it was normal. The Master of the Rolls read the single judgment, to which each 
member of the Court had ‘contributed’,15 of a specially constituted Court of Appeal of 
five, the Master of the Rolls sitting with three Lords Justice of Appeal and a High 
Court judge. A ‘selection’ of eight cases, of which Heil v Rankin was but one, were 
joined,
16
 and interested other parties, such as the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI), the Association of Personal Injuries Lawyers (APIL), the Eagle Star Insurance 
Co, and the Government in the form of an official amicus, were allowed in various 
ways to intervene.
17
 Argument was entirely confined to (1) whether the Court of 
Appeal was the appropriate forum for uplifting non-pecuniary loss damages; (2) 
whether an uplift inevitably with retrospective effect breached the European 
Convention; and, the answers to these questions being yes and no respectively, (3) 
what the uplift should be. Though applied to the joined cases, the decision about the 
uplift was stated in the most general terms, being intended to effect all personal injury 
cases.
18
 A belief then held by all professionally involved in personal injury litigation 
that the Law Commission’s recommendation was about to be given some important 
effect by some means had led to a great many cases throughout the court system being 
placed on hold.
19
 The judgment uniquely (Lewis 2001: 101) included a graph which, 
though markedly defective (Bennett 2000: 130), was intended to give general 
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guidance. In completely confident anticipation of an uplift, the Judicial Studies Board 
held itself in readiness to revise its Guidelines for the assessment of non-pecuniary 
loss damages,
20
 and the revision appeared less than four months after the judgment 
was handed down (Judicial Studies Board 2000).
21
 It is preposterous to regard this as 
procedurally normal litigation. As a matter of procedure, it was what we might, 
following Professor Harlow, call ‘surrogate legislation’, being a case in which ‘the 
bipolar, adversarial nature of the lawsuit had been demolished’ and replaced by 
‘procedures … reminiscent of Parliamentary Private Bill procedure’ (Harlow 2002: 
11). 
 Secondly, it is undeniable that the Law Commission saw litigation such as was 
arranged in Heil v Rankin or legislation to this effect as, if I might put it this way, 
functional equivalents. The recommended uplift was to be brought about and the point 
was to adopt the quickest way of doing so. Given the role in the setting of levels of 
general damages for personal injury which the Court of Appeal has come to assume,
22
 
this meant comparing the speed with which the desired uplift could be brought about 
by either that court or by Parliament, and this exactly the way they were considered as 
alternatives in the Report on non-pecuniary loss (Law Commission 1999a: para. 5.10). 
In a passage of the last Annual Report of the Commission to which he contributed, 
drafted just as the Court of Appeal was hearing Heil v Rankin, Burrows reviewed the 
position thus: 
we recommend that … increases would be best achieved by the higher 
courts exercising their powers to issue guidelines in a case or series of 
cases. However, if the increases recommended are not achieved within a 
reasonable time (for example, three years), legislation should be 
introduced to implement our recommendations. The Government has 
made it clear that it will not itself consider this Report as it concerns an 
area of the law which is in the courts’ independent sphere, where the 
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courts can take such account, if any, of the Commission’s views as they 
choose and where the Government have no plans to legislate … At the 
time of writing, the Court of Appeal (sitting as a five judge court headed 
by the Master of the Rolls) is hearing eight joined appeals for the purpose 
of considering the Law Commission’s recommendations as to the levels of 
damages for non-pecuniary loss (Law Commission 2000: para. 23). 
 In his Festschrift chapter, Burrows was able to expand on his thinking about the 
relationship between legislative and judicial reform of the common law, and it is 
worth quoting some of these fascinating comments at length: 
Perhaps oddly for a former Law Commissioner, I have never been a great 
fan of legislative reform of the non-criminal common law. Indeed, my 
years at the Law Commission merely served to reinforce my legislative 
scepticism … the vagaries of the legislative process mean that whether 
time is found legislation depends almost entirely on whether one can fit 
one’s law reform within the political imperatives of the day and has little, 
or no, relationship to the quality of, or necessity for, the reform proposed 
… At root my approach may rest on a belief that our judges are to be 
trusted on developments in the common law in a way that our politicians 
should not be. 
  This legislative scepticism means that, for example, I think judges 
should be very wary of leaving possible reform of the common law to the 
legislature[. I am very critical of] arguments that, because the legislature 
has not enacted some reform, it is the intention of Parliament that there 
should be no reform of [the relevant common law]. The truth is that there 
is a myriad of reasons why Parliament may not have legislated on a matter 
and it is incorrect to regard [this] as necessarily reflecting a considered 
choice. 
  The upshot of this is that, while we at the Law Commission did not 
achieve fully what we had hoped in terms of the precise level of increase, 
the decision in Heil v Rankin was a triumph in terms of the methodology 
of law reform. It showed what could be achieved by a close working 
relationship between the Law Commission and the judiciary. I am 
convinced that, had we waited for legislation, we would still be waiting 
…if like me, you trust judges and have some scepticism about legislation 
in relation to English private law, there are alternatives … reform of the 
common law can be achieved by the judges, even in areas where it might 






Some Criticisms of What Was Done in Heil v Rankin and of How It Was Done 
I have but one criticism of Heil v Rankin which I believe to be novel. But in order to 
make it I must situate it amongst criticisms more than adequately made by others, 
which I will be very brief in reviewing.
 
 
 Even to those, like myself, who have every sympathy with Burrows’ criticism 
of Parliamentary law-making, the question immediately arises of the justification for 
Burrows, not merely criticising Parliament, but stepping into its place in the sense of 
himself effectively passing legislation which Parliament would not. No amount of 
criticism of Parliamentary procedure gives Burrows a mandate to do this. It does not 
even speak to the issue whether he had such a mandate, and Burrows’ justification of 
his methodology of law reform is in this sense a mere non-sequitur. I will not attempt 
to examine the institutional position that, as a matter of fact, did give Burrows the 
power to legislate. I will simply say that this power is democratically unjustifiable for 
all the reasons set out by inter alia Harlow (2002: 10-12). One, of course, feels very 
awkward saying this, but the fault surely is that of Burrows himself, for, as the late 
Mr. Weir (2000: 638) unforgettably put it, the Law Commission’s conduct was 
constitutionally ‘impertinent’, and the Court of Appeal’s complicity with it 
‘astonishing’.23 
 This procedurally illegitimate process was, in large part as a consequence of this 
illegitimacy, substantively incompetent. Though, as I have said, the set of Reports 
produced under Burrows (and Beatson) was the most extensive official examination 
of the law of personal injury since the Pearson Commission, they were not at all a 
comprehensive review of the operation of the personal injury system even in the 
Pearson sense. Those Reports were overwhelmingly of a ‘black-letter’ character and, 
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in keeping with Burrows’ approach in his academic work, in which the defence of tort 
(Burrows 1998b: 122-26) is based on granting only a very small role to the social 
sciences in the discussion of legal issues generally (Burrows 1998c: 112-14), they 
completely avoided consideration of the issues central to the compensation debate. 
Ignoring these issues was essential to Heil v Rankin, and its consequent indefensibility 
on any of the grounds of distributive justice which do not go away just because they 
are ignored have all been discussed by Professor Lewis (2001, 2016). To his 
discussion it is necessary only to add that, even were the steps taken in Heil v Rankin 
defensible, as those steps were taken in the way they were, it was impossible to 
implement the transitional provisions necessary to make such implementation other 
than a shock, particularly, given the nature of what actually was done and the way it 
differed from what the Commission had recommended,
24
 to the NHS (Bennett 2000: 
133). 
 The combination of democratic unaccountability and extremely limited scope of 
inquiry that characterises the Law Commission’s input into Heil v Rankin follow from 
a central feature of the case which itself constitutes a ground of its unacceptability. 
The handing down of Heil v Rankin involved a really quite extraordinary number of 
people. Leaving aside the role of the Law Commission itself, the consideration by a 
Court of Appeal expanded to five of eight actions involved more than sixteen parties, 
including insurers, local authorities and health services, the cases of which were 
presented by twenty eight counsel. I have mentioned that interventions from a range 
of interested private parties such as insurers and legal professional groups and from 
the Government were allowed. But even so, this represented a very highly restricted 
group all taking variants of the mainstream position about the personal injury system 
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based on the disregard of the fundamental issues of the compensation debate. We 
might call this the position of the personal injury cognoscenti. 
 Despite some insight into the process provided in Burrows’ (2015: 45-46) 
Festschrift chapter, how this group was precisely assembled remains essentially 
unknown and will always remain so. But that it was a closed group of personal injury 
cognoscenti bound to reach a decision in line with perpetuation of the personal injury 
system was all too apparent to those who watched the spectacle of Heil v Rankin at 
the time. As a group it is open to the criticism which Professor Atiyah (1997: 173) 
levelled at the Law Commission itself: it was ‘far too closely wedded to the system 
and its underlying value structure … to be able to bring to bear the independent 
scrutiny the system needs’. Burrows’ scepticism about private law reform through 
legislation constrained by political imperatives can have purchase only if the implicit 
claim that Burrows is himself (in consultation with others) competent to identify the 
public interest and to legislate for it is accepted. Argument over this is pointless. ‘It 
should be obvious enough’ that the views informing Heil v Rankin are themselves 
political in the sense that they are ‘inevitably partial and depend upon the perspective 
through which accident compensation is viewed’ (Lewis 2001: 111), and that 
Burrows’ implicit claim to legislative competence is wholly unacceptable. 
 
Compensation and the Common Law 
The criticisms of Heil v Rankin which I have just briefly reviewed seem to me to be 
overwhelming. Even were this not so, I do not think it can reasonably be said that 
those criticisms do not have very considerable force, and perhaps the most remarkable 
feature of Burrows’ Festschrift chapter is the utter sanguinity with which he views his 
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achievement, which is undisturbed by any consideration of these criticisms. Whilst 
part of this sanguinity must follow from the little or zero weight Burrows places on 
the issues raised in the compensation debate, it principally follows from his belief that 
the Commission and the Court of Appeal were not involved in legislation at all but in 
normal decision-making, which indeed would make those criticisms otiose. It is 
essential to ask, then, what is normal decision-making in this context? The initial 
answer to this question is, of course, quantification of compensation, but it will be 
shown that this is a very misleading answer. 
 As in innumerable other tort and personal injury cases, the judgment in Heil v 
Rankin begins with a reference to the duty to compensate and a citation of the dictum 
of Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co, which I will cite despite its 
extreme familiarity: 
where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of 
money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as 
possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been 
injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been 
in if he had not sustained the wrong.
25
 
And, as again in innumerable personal injury cases, further citation of almost equally 
familiar authority, this time that of Lord Pearce in H West and Son Ltd v Shephard, 
then supports the recognition that getting at ‘that sum’ in regard of non-pecuniary loss 
is, not merely difficult, but ‘essentially artificial’:26 
The court has to perform the difficult and artificial task of converting into 
monetary damages the physical injury and deprivation and pain and to 
give judgment for what it considers to be a reasonable sum.
27
 
Rather than dwell on the case law of this doublethink it is better to go straight to the 
horse’s mouth. For what is there really to add to what Lord Donaldson wrote in his 
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foreword to the first edition of the then Judicial Studies Board’s Guidelines on the 
award of non-pecuniary loss: 
Paradoxical as it may seem, one of the commonest tasks of a judge sitting 
in a civil court is also one of the most difficult. This is the assessment of 
general damages for pain, suffering, or loss of the amenities of life. Since 
no monetary award can compensate in any real sense, these damages 
cannot be assessed by a process of calculation. Yet whilst no two cases are 
ever precisely the same, justice requires that there be consistency between 
awards (Judicial College 2015: ix). 
 One cannot go on in this way. It is not good enough to acknowledge that the 
compensation of non-pecuniary loss is impossible and therefore artificial and then 
justify what one is doing on the basis that one actually is compensating it.
28
 Heil v 
Rankin exploits the possibilities opened up by the slovenliness of thought that is at the 
heart of personal injury law, indeed is essential to making the personal injury system 
possible, of treating payment for non-pecuniary loss as compensation when it is 
nothing of the sort. The issues have been discussed at interminable length in the 
compensation debate, and in one sense I have nothing to add to my previous criticism 
of non-pecuniary loss awards as ‘essentially fruitless and arbitrary’ (Harris et al. 
2002: 438). But it should be emphasised that it is because they are fruitless, i.e. do not 
compensate, that they are arbitrary, for in principle there is no actual compensatory 
basis on which they can be calculated. This is why they have to be assessed as 
‘conventional’ awards. 
 However, doing this inevitably runs into serious difficulty. It will be recalled 
that the last sentence of the previously quoted passage from Lord Donaldson’s 
foreword to the Guidelines was ‘Yet whilst no two cases are ever precisely the same, 
justice requires that there be consistency between awards’ (Judicial College 2015: ix). 
As there is no compensatory basis for awards, quantum cannot be derived from the 
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application of compensatory principles to the facts of a case and so the minimum of 
consistency between cases without which non-pecuniary loss could not survive has to 
be entirely based on determining with which cases the instant case should be classed 
so that the award will be of the same arbitrary quantum. 
 Obviously the simplest way to do this is to place such awards on a schedular 
basis, as with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, or even better to move to 
social security payment of administratively allocated benefits. It should be 
remembered that it was not to restrict provision against want in industrial injury and 
‘non-employment cases’ that the emergent British welfare state considered the 
abolition of the ‘action on the case’ (Departmental Committee on Alternative 
Remedies 1946: para. 25). This was done with a view to expanding such provision 
(ibid.: paras. 19-108).
29
 It is the present author’s principal criticism of the personal 
injury system that the goal of full compensation makes rational and just social 
security provision for incapacity impossible (Harris et al. 2002: 453-61).
30
 But 
maintaining the illusion that specific claimants are being compensated on an 
individual basis
31
 requires the squandering of the great expense of running the 
personal injury system as a system of litigation and settlement. 
 Even within this context, were the classification of cases normally done by 
actual legal argument in the sense of contested comparison of the facts of decided 
cases, this would itself be an impossible task which would place an unacceptable 
strain on the costs of litigation. In this situation, the post-war availability of Kemp and 
Kemp (1954-56)
32
 and the emergence of a personal injury cognoscenti able to predict 
awards which they know will not normally be challenged if they fall within a certain 
penumbra, have been essential to the continuation of the UK personal injury system. 
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And, of course, since 1992, the judicial bureaucracy has itself taken a major role in 
ensuring consistency by publishing its Guidelines (Judicial Studies Board 1992). The 
publication of these Guidelines must be added to the ways in which the state plays a 
direct role in supporting the so-called private law of the personal injury system. Legal 
advice about non-pecuniary loss quantum based on application of these guidelines is 
of the same nature as the administrative allocation of benefits.  
 One of the paralysing defects of the compensation debate has been that those 
critical of the personal injury system have allowed those who defend it to claim the 
justification of using the formal law. Though the empirical consequences of the 
personal injury system may be allowed to be partially or even wholly questionable, 
and, as I have said, in academic debate those consequences are rarely defended, it is 
assumed that courts adjudicate on the basis of the law of negligence pursuing the 
common law goal of compensation. But those critical of the personal injury system 
should follow the advice of the Reverend Hill not to let the Devil have the best tunes 
and insist that this assumption is unfounded.
33
 What the courts do when they give 
awards for non-pecuniary loss, though it may console, or be the sort of thing that 
should be done for those in such unfortunate positions, etc., is unconnected with 
compensation and therefore with the principles of the common law adjudication of 
private law. The claim that non-pecuniary loss payments are compensatory is 
necessary to make it possible that those payments be made through the operation of 
the private law, and that it has successfully served this function, whilst it does not 
justify the claim in logic or policy, unarguably has given the claim great significance. 
I have already put forward my view that it is wholly unacceptable to claim that Heil v 
Rankin was normal decision-making by the courts. But the reason this could possibly 
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be claimed is that, in a sense, it was normal decision-making, because this abnormal 
form of decision-making is normal in the sense of being perfectly common. This is 
the sort of thing courts making non-pecuniary loss awards do all the time: we have 
seen Lord Donaldson describe it as ‘one of the commonest tasks of a judge sitting in a 
civil court’ (Judicial College 2015: ix). 
 Without at all going into the constitutional law or legal philosophy of the 
matter, this paper, and the arguments made by others which it recapitulates, rest on a 
commitment to a distinction between adjudication and legislation in a strong 
separation of powers. The political virtue of legislation understood in this way is that 
it seeks to institutionalise democracy; the virtue of adjudication is that it seeks to 
institutionalise the rule of law based on respect for legality. If the personal injury 
system is judged as an attempt to institutionalise compensation for non-pecuniary 
loss, then it is an utter failure, because it does no such thing. It is a claim to be 
applying principles of compensation which makes a mockery of those principles. The 
most important aspect of this is that, if respect for legality had the place ascribed to it 
in Dicey’s constitutionalism, then such respect should be a very strong reason for 
abolition of the personal injury system. The great sense in Dicey is that there are some 
improving government actions that can be done only at such a cost to legality that 
they should not be done. Dicey has had to be ridiculed in order to allow the 
administrative law of the welfare state to greenlight actions of precisely that sort 
(Campbell 2010: 507-31). The public/private hybrid of the tort of negligence is 
judicial law-making by the courts which is the equivalent of much administrative law-
making by the government, that is to say, in an important sense not the making of law 
at all, except that, because it is legislated in court, negligence achieves what one 
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would have thought very difficult by being generally much poorer, despite the 
normally infinitely higher quality of those doing the law-making. 
 Non-pecuniary loss awards do not display the blatant absurdity characteristic of 
appellate reasoning over the extent of negligence liability, but this is for the bad 
reason that they entirely abandon quantification of compensation and substitute for it 
consistency of conventional awards; i.e. they abandon common law reasoning. Of 
course, were this done fully self-consciously, it would be a good thing. That non-
pecuniary loss awards are schedular or in effect are benefits should be recognised. In 
my opinion, such recognition would lead to no payments for non-pecuniary loss 
(which are, after all, fruitless) being made, and so to the personal injury system 
effectively being abolished. But if such payments were made, they would be paid as 
benefits, with the courts’ role being judicial review of administrative action. But this 
is precisely what is not done.  
 Burrows’ degree of unconcern at the criticisms which have been made of Heil v 
Rankin is, then, justified by the fact that, to the personal injury cognoscenti, the 
distinction between adjudication and legislation which informs those criticisms is 
most unfortunately naïve. The positive law of non-pecuniary loss quantification may 
be understood to be based on compensation, but when the cognoscenti say 
compensation in this context they understand it to mean a conventional award 
unrelated to compensation. I believe I can explain how most academic commentators 
are able to maintain this contradictory understanding. They are unaware of the 
contradiction because they know nothing of the quantification of personal injury 
damages and of damages for non-pecuniary loss in particular. Their lost years are the 
time they did not spend on studying personal injury quantum or the empirical 
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consequences of the personal injury system. They actually believe that a tort award 
normally compensates. 
 I do not, however, purport to explain how the personal injury cognoscenti can 
maintain the contradiction inherent in their use of the rhetoric of compensation to 
describe something they in a strong sense know is nothing of the sort as they turn to 
their Guidelines and their Kemp and Kemp to assist them in the settlement of an 
acceptable conventional award. But I do to criticise this understanding, for all the 
reasons reviewed in this paper and for the further reason to which I hope to have 
drawn attention: awarding damages for personal injury requires the abandonment of 
legality in the award of compensation as a principal virtue of common law 
adjudication.  
 
Confusion worse confounded: Simmons v Castle 
In 2012 in Simmons v Castle,
34
 the Court of Appeal again took the Heil v Rankin 
approach towards setting damages for personal injury. Burrows does not mention this 
case, nor the related Review of Civil Litigation Costs by Lord Justice Jackson (2009a), 
but Simmons very clearly illustrates the procedural consequences of Heil v Rankin and 
so must be considered here. In its general nature if not in its detailed form, Simmons 
was an inevitable development from Heil v Rankin if one accepts the Heil v Rankin 
approach. And, mirabile dictu, what was done in Simmons was even more 
questionable than what was done in Heil v Rankin itself. 
 In Simmons, the County Court awarded a claimant injured by the defendant’s 
admitted negligence £20,000 general damages and £2,730 special damages, which, 
with interest, amounted to a total award of £24,712. After the claimant was given 
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leave by the Court of Appeal to appeal against quantum, the parties settled on terms 
which maintained the award pro tem but allowed that it might be varied if the 
claimant’s medical condition deteriorated so as to cause further pecuniary loss. The 
County Court had declined to make any such provisional award. The Court of Appeal 
was asked to give consent to this settlement. I shall return to this settlement, but it was 
far more important that the Court took the opportunity to announce that, from just 
over eight months hence,
35
 general damages would be uplifted by 10%.
36
 Though this 
was not intended to affect Simmons itself, had it done so, this uplift would, of course, 
have meant that £22,000, not £20,000, would have been awarded. 
 One not forewarned by experience of Heil v Rankin would be disorientated by 
what was done in Simmons and particularly by how it was done. But whilst again the 
full story will never be known, if so forewarned, that story appears to be to 
considerable extent familiar. In November 2008, Sir Anthony Clarke, the then Master 
of the Rolls, after consultation with his brethren and with the Ministry of Justice, 
asked Lord Justice Jackson ‘To carry out an independent review of the rules and 
principles governing the costs of civil litigation and to make recommendations in 
order to promote access to justice at proportionate cost’ (Jackson 2009b: para. 2.1). 
Sir Rupert’s Final Report appeared in December 2009 and inter alia recommended 
that general damages should be uplifted by 10% (Jackson 2009a: 463 
(recommendation 10), 465 (recommendation 65(i))). Simmons was handed down on 
26 July 2012 and at that time it was known to the Court,
37
 and indeed throughout civil 
litigation practice, that certain other of Sir Rupert’s recommendations were to be 
brought into force by legislation
38
 on 1 April 2013, as indeed they were.
39
 The effect 
of Simmons was to bring this uplift about, the eight months’ delay being intended to 
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make the uplift simultaneous with the legislative implementation of these other 
recommendations. 
 I will postpone discussion of the question which will immediately strike even 
the reader aware of Heil v Rankin of how it was that such a recommendation could 
result from a review of litigation costs (Lewis 2016: 55). But, the recommendation 
having been made, a Court of Appeal even more conscious after Heil v Rankin of its 
role in setting the level of damages sought to implement that uplift. In a brief review 
of essentially the position previously examined in this paper, the Court of Appeal 
described a system in which the Judicial College would issue its Guidelines and those 
Guidelines would be based on pronouncements by a Court of Appeal which itself had 
‘not merely the power, but a positive duty, to monitor, and where appropriate to alter, 
the guideline rates for general damages in personal injury actions’.40 After Heil v 
Rankin, one can hardly call this a constitutional innovation, but, as we will see 
Simmons makes particularly clear, it nevertheless is an arrogation by the judiciary of a 
properly legislative function that is prejudicial to the democratic aspiration of the 
British constitution and to the integrity of common law adjudication. 
 It is impossible to be clear about why the settlement had to be approved by the 
Court of Appeal,
41
 but, even if one allows that this was necessary in this case, it 
would normally be the work of a single Lord Justice of Appeal on papers. However, 
the Court in Simmons could hardly have been more distinguished: Lord Judge CJ, 
Lord Neuberger MR
42
 and Maurice Kay LJ. Such a bench found the adjudicative task 
which was the pretext for its assembly in no way daunting, and the settlement was 
approved as follows: ‘There is no reason not to approve this settlement’.43 Despite the 
three judge bench set to this task, the cast of CB de Mille proportions assembled for 
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Heil v Rankin was reduced to a size which calls Samuel Beckett to mind; indeed the 
Beckett of Not I, as no actual action occurred. The parties themselves took no part for 
the rather good reason that no hearing at all took place and so the Court was not even 
addressed by counsel. But the Court found this acceptable as it did ‘not seem to us to 
be appropriate, let alone necessary, for us to be so addressed’.44 All was utterance as 
the single judgment of the Court of Appeal was handed down by Judge CJ. 
 I have argued that, viewed as procedure, it is preposterous to regard Heil v 
Rankin as normal decision-making by the courts. Valuable conventions about the way 
one can criticise judicial statements would deny me the even stronger language which 
would be needed to respond to any judicial claim that Simmons was decision-making 
of this sort. It is fortunate, then, that no such claim was really made. The ritual 
incantations of, in this instance, H West and Sons Ltd v Shephard
45
 and Wright v 
British Railways Board,
46
 were briefly performed,
47
 but it was admitted that what was 
somewhat misleadingly called the ‘set of facts’48 in Simmons was ‘no doubt … an 
unusual basis on which to rest a judgment or to adjust guidelines’.49 Those facts were 
not any facts relating to the interests of the nominal parties but were ‘the forthcoming 
change in the civil costs regime initiated by Sir Rupert Jackson’s reforms’.50 That 
Simmons was legislation in all but name and that, therefore, the uplift it brought about 
cannot be claimed to be the outcome of common law reasoning about compensation 
of a calculable, non-pecuniary loss, seems to me to be conceded, albeit almost 
silently. I certainly would be put at a loss to argue against a claim that Simmons was 
normal decision-making by the courts because I do not see any intellectually serious 
way in which such a claim could be made.
51






 That Simmons was, in effect, a Practice Direction (albeit a Practice Direction 
of more significance than much primary legislation) was rather hammered home 
when, two months after Simmons itself, a sort of appeal was heard by the same Court 
and Judge CJ handed down a single ‘further judgment’ which was reported as a 
Practice Note.
53
 The insufficiently clear statement in Simmons itself about when the 
uplift was to take effect
54
 was rendered more precise in the Practice Note when the 
Court said that Simmons was to apply to ‘the very large number of actions in the 
future’55 in which ‘judgment was given after 1 April 2013’.56 The Court of Appeal 
had thought that this delay would avoid the difficulties about the absence of 
transitional provisions which it noted had beset Heil v Rankin.
57
 It is, with respect, 
difficult to understand why the Court thought this could entirely be the case, for, of 
course, what it said in Simmons put those advising current or prospective litigants 
effectively under an obligation to consider whether to seek to draw things out until 
after, or, from the other perspective, draw things to a close before, 1 April 2013. It 
therefore is in one way most unsurprising that the ABI would have wished to apply to 
have the Court of Appeal reconsider whether the uplift should apply only ‘to cases 
where the claimant’s funding arrangements had been agreed after 1 April 2013’.58 
 What, nevertheless, is most surprising is that the ABI actually could make any 
such application, the procedural possibility of which I cannot purport to fully 
explain.
59
 Though, to be precise, the ABI made two applications, one in its own name 
and one in the name of the defendant, these were effectively one application made by 
the ABI which, as argued, did not even refer to the merits of the defendant’s liability, 
and neither claimant nor defendant appeared, nor were their interests represented.
60
 
The Court heard submissions from the ABI expressive of the position of those who 
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would in the first instance have to pay for the uplift, and from APIL and the Personal 
Injuries Bar Association (PIBA), taking the position of those wishing to claim the 
uplift. The proceedings (one is at a loss for an apt term) were reported in the Practice 
Note were a sort of inquiry into a general policy based on evidence submitted by 
interested parties, comment on the wisdom of which procedure is supererogatory after 
what I have said of Heil v Rankin. That this was not litigation but rather a further 
exercise in what Harlow called surrogate legislation is, it is submitted, flatly 
undeniable, and, as with Simmons itself, the particular feature added to Heil v Rankin 
by the Practice Note is that this is not really denied: 
So far as procedural matters are concerned, there is no suggestion by 
APIL or PIBA that it is not open to ABI to make their application, at least 
through the respondent, Mr Castle. In our view, the court does have 
jurisdiction to entertain ABI’s application (and, indeed, PIBA’s proposal). 
It would be surprising if that were not so, as the effect of our earlier 
decision was, and was intended, to affect the outcome of a very large 
number of actions in the future, in which Mr Simmons and Mr Castle, the 
only parties to these proceedings at that time, had no interest, and were 
not represented. Accordingly, if, in reaching our decision, we failed to 
take relevant matters into account to the detriment of one group of future 
litigants, it would be wholly unjust if someone representing that group 
was unable to ask us to reconsider our decision. It seems to us clear that 
there is jurisdiction to entertain ABI’s application, in the light of the very 
exceptional nature of the exercise we were carrying out, namely giving 
guidance as to future practice rather than laying down any general 
principle of law, in a case where the parties were not represented, and no 




Executive, Legislature and Judiciary in Simmons v Castle 
The background to the Master of the Rolls asking Lord Justice Jackson to conduct his 
review was the great public concern that changes to the funding of civil, and 
particularly personal injury, litigation begun by the Woolf reforms, which, of course, 
were expressly intended to further access to justice, had badly failed to control the 
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costs of a process which had become, in the opinion of Lord Woolf himself, ‘now far 
too expensive’.62 This expense was not only generally indefensible but encompassed, 
indeed fairly could be said to be characterised by, charging practices described as 
‘nothing short of scandalous’ by Mr Jack Straw when Lord Chancellor (Jackson 
2009b:ch. 1, para. 1.3). The size of the problem
63
 was conveyed in comments by 
Professor Ian Scott QC (Hon), General Editor of the White Book,
64
 quoted by Sir 
Rupert in his Preliminary Report: 
I do fear that the profession to which I belong has lost its soul and is far 
too preoccupied with making money. Further, I think it is capable by its 
actions of killing the goose that has laid the golden egg. Another thing I 
feel strongly about is the shocking squandering of scarce court resources 
on refereeing of disputes about costs (ibid.: ch. 3, para. 5.50 n. 104). 
Sir Rupert summed up his own view of the ‘cherry picking’ of claims which he 
seemed to see as the most objectionable specific issue in this way: 
Having worked in the legal profession for 37 years, I have a high regard 
for my fellow lawyers, both solicitors and counsel. The fact remains, 
however, that lawyers are human … work tends to follow the most 
remunerative path. In my view, it is a flaw of the recoverability regime 
that it presents an opportunity to lawyers substantially to increase their 
earnings by cherry picking. This is a feature which tends to demean the 
profession in the eyes of the public (Jackson 2009a: ch. 10, para. 4.19).
65
 
 We have seen that the eight month delay in implementing the decision in 
Simmons was intended to make that implementation simultaneous with other of Sir 
Rupert’s principal recommendations which were to be brought into force by statute. 
These recommendations were to abolish or limit the use of the various innovations in 
charging practices, such after-the-event insurance, conditional fees, contingency fees 
and (aspects of) Part 36 Offers, by which, to use the term very broadly, the ‘success 
fee’ had been introduced in the period since Woolf. But though the use of specific 
charging arrangements was to be, if I might put it this way, reduced (and I shall refer 
 29 
 
to these of Sir Rupert’s recommendations as the ‘reducing’ recommendations), Sir 
Rupert, in his own view and in light of the consultation he had undertaken, had ‘no 
objection in principle’ to lawyers ‘reasonably’ adjusting their fees dependant on 
whether their client was not, or more importantly was, successful. He therefore 
proposed to allow the continuance of the success fee whilst, for example, outright 
abolishing some forms of conditional fee agreement (Jackson 2009a: ch. 10, para. 
4.20). Though recognising that prior to Woolf ‘many people [had] regarded it as an 
anathema for lawyers to have a financial stake in the outcome of litigation which they 
were conducting’, Sir Rupert maintained that ‘this was no longer the case’ (ibid.: 
ch.10, para. 1.8). 
 I have mentioned that Sir Rupert’s review was established after discussions 
amongst the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice, and it was essentially his reducing 
recommendations that the Ministry had consulted upon (Ministry of Justice 2010: sec 
2)
66
 and had obtained legislation for when Simmons was decided. The task facing the 
Court of Appeal as it understood it
67
 was to take the step necessary to complement the 
imminent statutory implementation of Sir Rupert’s recommendations 7, 9, 14 and 94 
(Jackson 2009a: 463, 464, 470)
68
 by judicially implementing recommendations 10 and 
65(i) (ibid.: 463, 468). 
 What became The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012, Pt 2 received substantial debate in Parliament. A major theme, perhaps the 
major theme, of this debate
69
 was concern about the effect of the reducing 
recommendations on changes brought about by Woolf which undoubtedly had 
increased the amount of personal injury litigation and so could, as was claimed by Mr 





 be said to have worked ‘in the main part very well [having] created a viable 
market in legal services and permitted access to justice for millions since it was 
introduced’.71 This debate was, of course, limited in nature, with the fundamental 
question whether the personal injury system is so bad that extending access to it, i.e. 
making it work better, would actually cause a welfare loss,
72
 not being broached. But, 
within such confines, Mr Slaughter was concerned that the Government’s proposed 
way of ameliorating the effect of the reducing recommendations might not work 
because the uplift was insufficient: ‘To make up for part of those losses, the 
Government plan a 10% increase in damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity. 
Simple maths should be sufficient to show that that will not make up for all losses’.73  
 There is no doubt that Sir Rupert saw an uplift of 10% as a vital part of ‘a 
coherent package of interlocking reforms’ (Jackson 2009a: i, 462) which ‘should be 
accepted or rejected as a package’,74 the role of the uplift effectively being to provide 
a ‘quid pro quo for loss of success fees’ (Anon 2012). After deciding upon his 
reducing recommendations, Sir Rupert believed that: 
The follow-on question which arises is whether any measures and, if so, 
what measures ought to be taken to assist claimants to meet the success 
fees which they will have to pay in successful cases out of damages or 
other sums recovered … The measures which I propose are [that] In order 
to assist personal injury claimants in meeting the success fees out of 
damages, I recommend that … The level of general damages for pain, 
suffering and loss of amenity be increased by 10% across the board 
(Jackson 2009a: ch. 10, paras. 5.1-5.3). 
Sir Rupert proceeded with his reducing recommendations only because he was of the 
opinion that the uplift would leave hardly any claimants net worse off, and indeed 
would leave most better off. In reaching this opinion, Sir Rupert placed a heavy 
reliance on the advice as he understood it of Professor Paul Fenn, very arguably the 
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UK’s leading economist studying civil procedure, who was an ‘assessor’ for Sir 
Rupert’s review (Jackson 2009a:ch. 10, para. 5.4), and Sir Rupert believed himself to 
be confirmed in his opinion by further analysis by Professor Fenn after the publication 
of Sir Rupert’s Final Report.75 It is essential to put this concern about whether 
claimants would be worse off in context. The purpose of the uplift was to ensure that 
the fund out of which defensible success fees, if I can put it this way, could be paid 
would effectively be maintained (Jackson 2009a: Executive Summary, para. 2.4).
76
 




 I am obliged to insist at this point that, though it is in any case impossible to 
claim that a quasi-legislative 10% uplift can be ascribed to compensation of a 
calculable loss, a justification of that uplift explicitly in terms of the financing of 
litigation is, satis superque, evidence that we are not at all dealing with common law 
adjudication of compensation. In its Consultation Paper on implementing Sir 
Rupert’s recommendations, the Government itself seemed to concede this: 
adjustments to the level of general damages have hitherto been regarded 
as a judicial issue for the courts rather than the Government, and the 
general question of whether damages are currently too low is properly a 
matter for the judiciary. [But an] increase in the level of damages which is 
expressly made for the purpose of assisting claimants to meet their costs 
liabilities rather than for the purpose of compensating them for the injury 
that they have suffered would represent a fundamental change in the 
nature of the general damages award, and could create a precedent for 
calls to depart from the compensatory principle in other circumstances 
(Ministry of Justice 2010: paras. 97-98). 
This concession, made apparently without any awareness of Heil v Rankin, did not, to 
my knowledge, receive further Government consideration of sufficient substance as to 
itself require discussion here. This is as it may be. But the Government’s apparent 
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concession was, however, mentioned in the Practice Note,
78
 and it is regrettable in the 
extreme that nothing of any greater substance in defence of this position was said 
even by the Court of Appeal.  
 I do not want to discuss the substantive merits of Sir Rupert’s recommendation 
of an uplift, those merits, if the discussion is framed within a basic acceptance of the 
personal injury system and the success fee, turning on a complex analysis of the 
detailed incentives provided by alternative charging arrangements.
79
 I want to ask 
why the question about the effectiveness of the quid pro quo raised by Mr Slaughter 
and seen as essential by Sir Rupert himself received no more full consideration by the 
Government or in Parliamentary debate. The Government’s response to Sir Rupert’s 
Final Report began by taking the line which was to become familiar of noting (not 
entirely accurately) his felicitous phrase about his recommendations being a package 
of interlocking reforms (Ministry of Justice 2011: para. 40). But though it was made 
clear that the Government intended to implement the reducing recommendations 
through legislation, the uplift was treated as one of a number of ‘associated measures’ 
in the interlocking package and nothing was said about how it was to be implemented 
(ibid.: para. 7). In line with the way it was envisaged it would be implemented, the 
uplift was not in the legislation as introduced,
80
 and in Committee debate of that 
legislation Mr Slaughter was concerned about this or, more precisely, about the 
possibility that there being nothing in the Bill meant that the uplift might not 
materialise: 
A 10% uplift sounds good, but there is nothing in the Bill about it; it will 
be dealt with elsewhere. The mechanisms for doing that have to be 
absolutely clear and transparent so that there will be a 10% uplift on 
whatever the [general damages without the 10% are]. I hope that the 
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Minister will address that when he has the opportunity, because we do not 
have anything on that at the moment.
81
 
 Mr Slaughter received the following assurance from Mr Jonathan Djanogly, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, who had signed the Government 
response to the Final Report: 
Let me also address the 10% uplift in general damages … Not all the 
measures in the package of reform require primary legislation … The 
senior judiciary has agreed to look at how to take forward the increase in 
general damages for non-pecuniary loss, such as pain, suffering and loss 
of amenity in tort cases, by 10%.
82
 
Though, of course, this will not have been the only channel by which Mr Djanogly 
became aware of the position of the senior judiciary, he will have benefitted from Sir 
Rupert’s own response to the Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper on the Final 
Report, which said the following about the ‘Method of achieving the adjustment’: 
The Consultation Paper states at para. 97: “adjustments to the level of 
general damages have hitherto been regarded as a judicial issue for the 
courts rather than the Government”. I agree and have not included this 
item in the list of reforms requiring legislation. It will be recalled that in 
so far as [the Report on non-pecuniary loss’s] recommendations for 
increasing personal injury damages were accepted, those increases were 
implemented by means of a guideline judgment handed down by a five 
member Court of Appeal, presided over by the Master of the Rolls: see 
Heil v Rankin … The same procedure could be adopted for implementing 




 In sum, Sir Rupert, and so therefore the senior judiciary, and the Government 
from the outset intended to introduce the reducing measures by legislation and 
believed the interlocking uplift could be obtained by a Heil v Rankin manoeuvre, 
which indeed it was in Simmons. Parliamentary scrutiny of this was essentially only of 
whether the uplift would take place and whether it was enough. In justification of the 
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already mentioned absence of counsel in Simmons, the Court of Appeal described this 
process of implementation thus: 
unlike in Heil v Rankin, we have not been addressed by counsel on the 
issue of increasing the level of general damages. It does not seem to us to 
be appropriate, let alone necessary, for us to be so addressed. Quite apart 
from the points already made, Sir Rupert consulted widely before 
publishing his Interim Report and before publishing his Final Report, and 
the Ministry of Justice subsequently consulted on Sir Rupert’s main 
proposals, and they have also subsequently been debated in (and out of) 
Parliament. Unusual though we accept that it is, it seems clear to us that 
there would simply be no point in incurring expense and time in going 
over ground which has already been well trodden in order to debate a 
point which will only involve future judgments and is part of a coherent 
package, the rest of which has already been brought into law.
84
 
Two categories of recommendation made by Sir Rupert are elided here, though 
distinguishing them is, or would have been, essential for anything approaching 
democratic debate of his recommendations overall. 
 The Woolf reforms addressed a situation in which it was perceived that access 
to justice was seriously inadequate. One result of those reforms was a wholly 
questionable (even to those supportive of the personal injury system) expansion of 
personal injury litigation involving charging practices that gave rise to the gravest 
concern. Having been asked to address this situation, Lord Justice Jackson made 
recommendations which, though intendedly interlocking and to be accepted or 
rejected as a package, fall into two categories. One is the category of reducing 
recommendations, intended to abolish or restrict the use of the success fee, understood 
widely, which was at the heart of the charging practices in question. This category of 
recommendation was largely implemented by legislation following extensive 
consultation and debate, as the Court of Appeal claimed in the passage just quoted. At 
the heart of the other category, not to be implemented by legislation but by a 
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‘judgment’ of the Court of Appeal, was the 10% uplift. The purpose of this uplift was 
to ‘compensate’ claimants denied use of the success fee, but this is in an important 
sense a very misleading way of putting the point, for the purpose of doing this was to 
provide a quid pro quo for the loss of the success fee, and the quid pro quo would, of 
course, therefore end up in the hands of the legal profession! 
 In my opinion, whilst there was overwhelming public support for the reducing 
recommendations, there would have been no such support for measures intended to 
give back to the legal profession what the reducing recommendations had taken away. 
How will we ever know whether I am right (until another Heil v Rankin is called for, 
and not even then if the Heil v Rankin approach to legislation is taken again)? The 
purpose of this paper is to challenge the inevitable consequence of treating damages 
in this way: the undermining of both the democracy of proper legislative procedure 
and the legality of proper adjudication of common law compensation. But I am 
obliged to further point out that Simmons, in response to conduct by the legal 
profession that the then Lord Chancellor described as scandalous, placed, by 
democratically inadequate means in which the senior judiciary played a central role, a 
heavy monetary impost on the citizens of the UK in support of a system which is of 
incontrovertible benefit to none save the legal profession (and related intermediaries). 
Though I acknowledge that, like Heil v Rankin, Simmons has led to no public scandal, 
what it did is also, in its way, scandalous. 
 
Conclusion: The Cognoscenti and Democracy 
In this paper I have recapitulated the criticisms made of Heil v Rankin as judicial 
legislation and to these I have tried to show that what has been the main response to 
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these criticisms, amplified by Burrows in his Festschrift chapter, that Heil v Rankin 
was not judicial legislation at all but merely normal decision-making by a court, is 
quite wrong. The full extent of the mischief of Heil v Rankin emerges in that it is, not 
only incompetent and illegitimate legislation, but a complete distortion of common 
law adjudication of the private law of compensation. Proper legislative and legal 
reasoning were abandoned by a band of legal cognoscenti at the centre of which was 
the Law Commission in order to effect a very important legislative alteration in the 
law which that cognoscenti thought desirable but did not think could be obtained 
through Parliament. In Simmons v Castle, every objectionable procedural feature of 
Heil v Rankin was exaggerated. 
 And though this paper principally is a criticism of the procedural aspects of Heil 
v Rankin, it should not be forgotten that objectionable procedure may well lead to 
objectionable results. Burrows (2016: 47) concludes the discussion of Heil v Rankin 
in his Festschrift chapter by telling us that ‘I am convinced that, had we waited for 
legislation, we would still be waiting’. I myself think this may well have been so, but 
not only because of the shortcomings of Parliamentary procedure. For Parliament may 
not have done as Burrows thought fit for a reason he does not consider. There is, in 
my opinion, no prospect whatsoever of a legislative debate which properly canvassed 
the fundamental issues, not to speak of a new Pearson, leading to the uplifts made in 
Heil v Rankin or in Simmons because they are a gross waste of resource which are 
bound to have pernicious consequences. We will never know as it is the very point of 
Burrows’ way of proceeding to avoid the inconvenience of such debate. 
 The main specific topic which occupied the late Ronald Coase, the most 
important post-war writer on regulatory theory, over his very long and distinguished 
 37 
 
career, was broadcasting policy, and the only book in the sense of a substantial 
monograph he published, until he added a second in the year before his death at the 
age of 102 (Coase and Wang 2012), was on the BBC (Coase 1950). Evaluating ‘the 
really important argument … that a monopoly was required in order that there should 
be a unified programme policy’ (ibid.: 191) so successfully made by John, later Lord, 
Reith, Coase said the following: 
This argument is powerful and on its implications it is no doubt logical. 
Its main disadvantage is that to accept its assumptions it is necessary first 
to adopt a totalitarian philosophy or at any rate something verging on it 
(ibid.). 
If one accepts the existence of the personal injury system then, as I have 
acknowledged, Heil v Rankin, or even the Law Commission’s proposals, seem 
eminently sensible. The main disadvantages of doing so are that one has to abandon 
rational criteria for evaluating economic and legal policy formulation and abandon 
legality in common law adjudication, all in defiance of the democratic aspiration of 
the UK constitution. 
 Both the programme policy and the monopoly of the BBC have, of course, been 
very much modified since the heyday of Lord Reith. But though its revenue can be 
sustained only by an immense act of criminalisation,
85
 the BBC is an acme of 
transparency and accountability by comparison to the process which led to the 
triumph celebrated by Burrows. My ability to understand that process is far greater 
than that of almost everyone else who is paying for that triumph, and I do not purport 
to understand it. Leaving aside the undeniable degree of controversy which attends 
the maintenance of the personal injury system, the particular degree of confidence in 
one’s grasp of the correct policy needed to arrogate to oneself the power the Law 
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Commission has exercised is breath-taking, and lamentable to those who place a value 
on democracy. British democracy, however, certainly is subject to the defects 
Burrows claims. But, bearing Churchill’s wisdom in mind, is it legitimate to turn to a 
certainly far less democratic alternative which it is almost beside the point to note was 
markedly partial in its approach and as a result has certainly favoured a sectional 
interest? The Law Commission, it appears, entertained no doubt.  
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  The thinking of the Committee exemplifies the shortcomings of the current debate. 
Though centrally concerned with the amount of fraud which the personal injury 
system produces, the Committee does not inquire into the nature and consequences 
of third party liability but advocates tactics, such as raising thresholds for legal aid, 
which are intended to limit claimants’ ability to exercise rights which, in the 
absence of such an inquiry, the Committee acknowledges them to have. Such 




what are, no matter how inadequately defined, ex ante rights. The only just course 
is to define these rights adequately ex ante. 
2
  Though it is wholly tangential to my concerns here, to avoid misunderstanding I 
should say I intend this claim to apply to Beever (2011). For though Beever is right 
to say that a social ontology of obligations should have at its base private law 
duties and rights between citizens, he entirely allows those citizens to covenant to 
each other that they will acknowledge a state which enforces those duties and 
rights. 
3
  Lewis’ (2012) paper in this collection summarises his career’s work leading the 
effort to capture the role of the state I am trying to convey. 
4
  Since this paper was drafted, Burrows’ views on the desirable relationship between 
courts and legislature which are discussed in this paper was made the theme – 
Legislation and the Role of the Judiciary - of the 2016 Annual Conference of the 
Society of Legal Scholars convened under his Presidency. 
5
  [2001] QB 272 (CA). 
6
  This was the overwhelming theme of comment on Heil v Rankin by those giving 
personal injury advice, e.g. Bennett (2000: 136) concluded his note on Heil v 
Rankin in the Journal of Personal Injuries Law with a quotation from Horace: ‘The 
mountains heaved in labour. They gave birth to a ridiculous mouse’. 
7
  A Consultation Paper had been issued three years previously (Law Commission 
1995a). An earlier Report (Law Commission 1994a) which conveyed the results of 
a survey, commissioned under Beatson and published under Burrows, of views 





  Burrows (1998a) is the fullest statement of Burrows’ views on legislative and 
common law law reform at the time he was a Commissioner. These views are 
largely conventional, but with hindsight one can detect hints (ibid.: 216-17) of the 
later ‘methodology’ of law reform. 
9
  The Report on non-pecuniary loss was published on 15 December 1998. The 
judgment in Heil v Rankin was handed down on 23 March 2001. 
10
  The Report on structured settlements to which reference will be made below had 
been produced under the Fifth Programme (Law Commission 1995b: 21). 
11
  c 48. Section 1 gave the Lord Chancellor a power in his executive capacity to 
adjust the assumed rate of return on structured settlement investments similar to 
that canvassed for various executive bodies in respect of non-pecuniary loss in the 
Report on non-pecuniary loss. The role of the structured settlement was 
extensively revised by the provisions for periodical payments made under The 
Courts Act 2003 s 100 (c 39). 
12
  [1980] AC 174 at 189C (HL(E)): 
 We are in the area of “conventional” awards for non-pecuniary loss, 
where comparability matters. Justice requires that such awards continue to 
be consistent with the general level accepted by the judges. If the law is to 
be changed … it should be done not judicially but legislatively within the 
context of a comprehensive enactment dealing with all aspects of damages 
for personal injury. 
 
13
  Heil v Rankin, n. 5 at [46]-[47]. The Court of Appeal seemed also to think it was 
obliged to distinguish the views of Lord Hutton in Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 
at 405F (HL(E)) but, with respect, those views were in support of measures such as 





  HC Deb (1998-99) vol. 337, col. 503WA (9 November 1999). 
15
  Heil v Rankin, n. 5 at 288A. 
16
  Ibid. at [31]. 
17
  Ibid. at [7]. 
18
  Ibid. at [31]. 
19
  Ibid. at [6]. 
20
  Ibid. at [84]. 
21
  The latest edition is Judicial College (2015). 
22
  Heil v Rankin, n. 5 at [4]-[5]. 
23
 These judgements were repeated in the 10th edn. (Weir 2004: 638), where the 
Court’s ‘deference’ to the Law Commission was further described as ‘perplexing’ 
(ibid.: vii).  
24
  Following on, of course, from what had been done in Wells v Wells, n. 13. 
25
  Heil v Rankin, n. 5 at [22], citing Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App 
Cas 25 at 39 (HL(Sc)). 
26
  Heil v Rankin, n. 5 at [23]. 
27
  Ibid., citing H West and Son Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326 at 364 (HL(E)). 
28
  I put to one side the immense difficulties of quantifying damages for loss of 
earnings and expenses, conceding for the purposes of argument that these are in 
principle quantifiable as compensation, though I do not in fact believe that they 
are. Burrows plays an important role in dealing with this problem as he is involved 
in the compilation of the Ogden Tables. 
29





  I am honoured that since this paper was drafted my opinion has received the fullest 
response in Beever (2016: 22-23).  
31
  In the highly instructive case of Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 QB 638 (CA), the claimant 
suffered brain injuries so catastrophic that she was reduced to a state of permanent 
unconscious immobility, a ‘living death’ in which she was ‘deprived of every 
faculty, except the bare capacity [with medical assistance] to breathe and to digest 
enough food to maintain her body’ (ibid. at 654, 652). The approach to quantifying 
losses of this nature taken in the earlier Benham v Gambling [1941] AC 157 
(HL(E)) was found to be ‘invidious … undesirable and as a matter of proof well-
nigh unattainable’ (Wise v Kaye, loc cit at 649), but it was, with respect, replaced 
with speculation not one whit superior. The trial court’s award of £17,400 based on 
general damages of £15,000 (circa £300,000 now) was upheld essentially because, 
as Diplock LJ put it, ‘I should not be prepared to say that the sum of £17,400 
awarded by the judge or for that matter an award of £50,000 or £100,000 was 
wrong’ (ibid. at 663). The award was made despite it being impossible for the 
claimant to personally receive any benefit at all from it (ibid. at 653-54, 656-59). 
This is compensation only in the very special sense described in the main text. 
32
  Kemp and Kemp is now available in continuously updated looseleaf and electronic 
versions. 
33
  The Reverend Rowland Hill (1744-1833), best known, of course, as the successful 
advocate of the penny post, appears to be the source of this (variously recorded) 
advice. 
34





  Ibid. at [13], [20]. 
36
  I shall exclusively concentrate on personal injury, though a purely formal argument 
for the extension of the uplift to non-pecuniary loss awarded in other torts which is 
traceable to Lord Justice Jackson had, by the time the Court of Appeal had finished 
with the matter, been further extended to contract! 
37
  Simmons v Castle, n. 34 at [7]. 
38
  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Pt 2 (c 10). The 
Royal Assent was given on 1 May 2012. 
39
  The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(Commencement No 8) Order 2013, Note as to Earlier Commencement Orders (SI 
1127/2013). 
40
  Simmons v Castle, n. 34 at [12]. 
41
  Ibid. at [2]. 
42
  When a sort of appeal from Simmons which will be discussed below was 
considered, Lord Neuberger had become President of the Supreme Court but 
nevertheless still served as a member of the, as it were, reconvened bench. 
43
  Ibid. at [5]. It was mere surplusage that the Court added that the £20,000 ‘seems a 
correct figure’ and the £2,730 ‘also appears to be right’. 
44
  Ibid. at [17]. This absence of counsel will be further discussed below. 
45
  n. 27. 
46
  [1983] 2 AC 773 (HL(E)). 
47
  Simmons v Castle, n. 34 at [8], [9], [18]. 
48





  Ibid. at [16]. 
50
  Ibid. at [15]. 
51
  I do not, of course, deny that such a claim has been and will be made, indeed 
variants on it are to be found throughout the various consultations made in the 
course of the formulation and especially of the implementation of Sir Rupert’s 
recommendations. 
52
  In consultation, Sir Rupert and the Government received much opinion that 
damages for non-pecuniary loss had in any case fallen behind inflation, and this 
Heil v Rankin argument for an uplift undoubtedly was also influential (Jackson 
2009a: ch. 10, para. 5.6). The way this general sentiment was used to elide a 
number of important difficulties in Sir Rupert’s recommendations was, with 
respect, the intellectually weakest part of his Final Report when assessed on, as it 
were, its internal criteria. 
53
  [2012] EWCA Civ 1288, [2013] 1 WLR 1229 at 1243-52. 
54
  Simmons v Castle, n. 34 at [2]. 
55
  Practice Note, n. 53 at [18]. 
56
  Ibid. at [19]. 
57
  Simmons v Castle, n. 34 at [13]. 
58
  Practice Note, n. 53 at [2]. 
59
  Ibid. at [3], [19]. CPR r 52.17 was forcibly but, with respect, unconvincingly 
affirmed in an attempt to suppress the obvious and obviously highly unwelcome 




colourable interest disappointed in the outcome of future litigation on any matter to 
make a similar application. 
60
  Practice Note, n. 53 at WLR 1243C. 
61
  Ibid. at [19]. 
62
  HL Deb (2010-12) vol. 718 col. 1166 (25 March 2010). 
63
  Sir Rupert’s terms of reference (Jackson 2009b:ch. 1, para. 2.1) did not encompass 
a general assessment of the overall social costs and benefits of the litigation 
undertaken but focused so far as possible solely on legal costs. 
64
  Professor Scott continues as a General Editor of the White Book, a colleague of its 
now Editor in Chief, Lord Justice Jackson. 
65
  An admirable evaluation of the general issue raised by the charging practices may 
be found in Jackson (2009a: ch. 10, para. 1.10). 
66
  The Government’s response to the Lord Justice Jackson’s Final Report in light of 
this consultation was Ministry of Justice (2011). 
67
  Simmons v Castle, n. 34 at [7]. A very informative review of the overall position at 
the time between the Practice Note being handed down and the legislation coming 
into force was provided by the Hon Mr Justice Ramsey (2013), who played the 
leading judicial role in the first two years of the implementation of Sir Rupert’s 
reforms. 
68
  The primary legislation Sir Rupert anticipated would be needed to implement these 
measures was specified (Jackson 2009a: 472). 
69
  This Act is a perfect example of the deplorable practice of putting all sorts of 




legislation of coherence and integrity, and measures described in the short title 
other than the Pt 2 reforms received more extensive debate than Pt 2 itself. 
70
  Mr Andy Slaughter, MP for Hammersmith, had, for twenty years prior to entering 
the Commons, been a Barrister with a specialism in personal injury. 
71
  HC Deb (2010-12) vol. 534 col. 1021 (2 November 2011). 
72
  Written in the earliest days of Woolf, Harris et al. (2002: 449) observed that: ‘It is 
very hard to conclude that a system which cannot be made to run better without 
imposing a welfare loss is other than indefensible’. 
73
  HC Deb (2010-12) vol. 534 col. 1022 (2 November 2011). I cannot forebear 
pointing out that, in the Government consultation over Sir Rupert’s Final Report, a 
response was made that ‘a 110% increase was needed to bring [general damages 
into] line with the EU and the US’ (Ministry of Justice 2011: para. 136). 
74
  Practice Note, n. 53 at [28]. 
75
  Jackson (2010: 19): ‘if the whole package of recommendations in the Final Report 
is implemented, far more than 61% of all PI claimants will benefit as a result of the 
reforms and far fewer than 39% will lose out as a result of the reforms’. The then 
Senior Costs Judge Mr Peter Hurst also signed Sir Rupert’s response. 
76
  In personal communication, Professor Fenn has told me that he believes that the 
reducing recommendations and the 10% uplift have not in fact been balanced ex 
post due to the unforeseen consequences of the Government’s fixed cost reforms, 
and the subsequent increase in success fees recovered from claimants. In my own 




providing some of the information on which my opinion is based), the likeliest 
result as we stand has been to make the success fee even more of an abuse. 
77
  Hence Sir Rupert was seriously concerned that when the uplift was not used to pay 
a success fee, this would represent an unjustifiable windfall to claimants (Jackson 
2009a: ch. 10, para. 5.6). His concern was an important theme of subsequent 
consultation and debate prior to the legislation (Ministry of Justice 2010: para. 99). 
78
  n. 53 at [23]. 
79
  For whatever my opinion is worth, Sir Rupert’s Review is very admirably clear-
sighted and frank and it is at least as authoritative as any other ‘official’ 
consideration of the issues since Pearson. Its recommendations amount to a highly 
perceptive fix necessary to keep the Heath Robinson contraption going in light of 
the unintended, though entirely predictable, indeed predicted, results of the last fix. 
Nevertheless, profound dissatisfaction remains amongst the senior judiciary, 
including Sir Rupert himself, and further reform is in the air (Jackson 2016). But 
these latest proposals make the schedular or otherwise administrative nature of the 
whole exercise even more clear. 
80
  HC (2010-12) Bill 205 (21 June 2011). 
81
  PBC Deb (2010-12) col. 483 (13 September 2011). 
82
  PBC Deb (2010-12) col. 491 (13 September 2011). 
83
  Sir Rupert went on (Jackson 2010: paras. 4.4-4.8) to reject ‘a possible refinement’ 
of the uplift proposal suggested by the Government which obviously would have 
interfered with the interlocking package. 
84





  The facts are, I think it fair to say, scarcely credible. In 2012, 193,049 persons 
were proceeded against for non-payment of the license fee (circa 12% of all 
proceedings in the Magistrates’ Courts!) and 164,932 convictions resulted: HL Deb 
vol. 749 col. WA300 (28 November 2013). In 2012, 51 persons were imprisoned 
for non-payment of fines arising from non-payment of the license fee: HC Dec 
(2014-15) vol. 761 col. 870WA (5 March 2014). 
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